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 Existing research on the subject of terrorism is vast, spanning causes of terrorism, the 
membership of terrorist groups, types of terrorist attacks, and more. One area of terrorism 
research, though, has received only limited consideration: terrorist target selection. What 
research does exist explains target selection almost exclusively as a function of ideology (Asal et 
al. 2009, 270 and 274; Drake 1998b, 54-56 and 58). However, such a limited causal focus 
obscures other possible, and probable, explanations of terrorist target selection. This paper 
proposes an alternative explanation of terrorist target selection that includes ideological and 
terrorist group capability variables, as well as a variable measuring the security levels in the 
geographic areas in which terrorist attacks take place.  
 A research design employing multiple ordinary least squares regression is utilized. The 
findings demonstrate the importance of the independent variables, as well as the significance of 
the effects of the two-way and three-way interactions of variables from the three categories. 
Furthermore, the multiple regression models explain a greater percentage of the effects of the 
independent variables on the percentage of attacks against civilian targets when the three-way 
interaction variable is included than when this interaction variable is not included. From these 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Embassies, football games, capitol buildings, subways, military barracks, and national 
monuments are all places where people gather, yet they are quite dissimilar. Diplomatic talks 
are conducted in embassies. Families gather to cheer on their favorite teams at football 
games. Laws are made in capitol buildings. People ride subways to work. Soldiers rest in 
their barracks. Excited tourists visit national monuments. The activities that take place at and 
the people in or at these locations are very different. However, each place, and each person, 
is a potential terrorist target. Existing research on the subject of terrorism is vast, spanning 
causes of terrorism, the membership of terrorist groups, types of terrorist attacks, and more. 
One area of terrorism research, though, has received only limited consideration: terrorist 
target selection. What research does exist explains target selection almost exclusively as a 
function of ideology (Asal et al. 2009, 270 and 274; Drake 1998b, 54-56 and 58). However, 
such a limited causal focus obscures other possible, and probable, explanations of terrorist 
target selection. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of terrorist target selection 
that includes ideological and terrorist group capability variables, as well as a variable 
measuring the security levels in the geographic areas in which terrorist attacks take place. In 
order to test this theory, a research design using multiple ordinary least squares regression is 
proposed. 
Problem 
 This thesis seeks to answer the question of what factors determine terrorist target 
selection. Detailed hypotheses concerning specific individual variables, as well as 
interactions between specific variables, will be included in the thesis. However, in general, in 
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accordance with the theory outlined below, decentralized terrorist groups are expected to 
attack a greater percentage of civilian targets, as opposed to government targets, when they 
are willing to sacrifice their own fighters and carry out their attacks in areas of low security. 
In contrast, decentralized terrorist groups are expected to attack a smaller percentage of 
civilian targets, as opposed to government targets, when they are unwilling to sacrifice their 
own fighters and carry out their attacks in areas of high security. 
Importance of Topic 
 This topic is extremely important to study because knowing what factors determine 
terrorist target selection will allow authorities to better preempt possible attacks. This is 
especially important, as attacks against civilians in Western states have increased. The 
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era of civilian 
vulnerability. This has been reiterated time and again. Recent attacks include the coordinated 
November 13, 2015, attacks in Paris, France and the March 22, 2016, bombings in Brussels, 
Belgium, among others (Faiola and Mekhennet 2015; Witte et al. 2016). Unfortunately, there 
exists a serious dearth of research concerning terrorist target selection. The majority of 
analyses, both qualitative and quantitative, that have been conducted focus solely on 
ideological explanations of terrorist target selection. Furthermore, ideologies have typically 
been categorized under quite broad classifications, such as religion or anti-government 
sentiments (Asal et al. 2009, 270 and 274; Drake 1998b, 56 and 58). The specific ideological 
mechanisms that lead to terrorist target selection, and which very well may span multiple 
traditional ideological categories, have not been isolated and explored. Little empirical, 
quantitative consideration has been given to the effects of terrorist group capability and area 
security on target selection. This thesis seeks to fill this research void by considering the 
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individual and interactive causal effects of ideological stances, capability, and area security. 
From the findings of this thesis, it is expected that specific policy recommendations in 
regards to security and attempts to create psychological counter-narratives to terrorist 
propaganda can be derived. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DEFINITIONS 
Defining Terrorism 
 Before examining the literature concerning terrorist target selection, one must first 
understand what terrorism is. Although no universal definition exists, a common collection of 
characteristics describing terrorism has emerged among scholars of the topic. Scholars such 
as Cronin (2003, 32-33), Meisels (2006, 474), Walzer (2002, 5), and Tilly (2004, 8-10) assert 
that terrorism is a form of violence perpetrated against noncombatants. Furthermore, 
terrorism is conducted in order to achieve a social and/or political goal. However, the 
mechanism by which this goal is achieved is not simply direct physical violence against 
innocents. Rather, what is most important is that the violence has a psychological effect on a 
target population beyond those who are physically harmed (Cronin 2003, 32-33; Findley and 
Young 2015, 1121; Meisels 2006, 474; Pape 2003, 345; Richardson 1999, 209; Walzer 2002, 
5; Tilly 2004, 8-10). 
 While these parameters provide a broad outline for defining terrorism, two of these 
characteristics are fiercely debated. The first is the requirement that the targets of terrorism 
be noncombatants. Pape (2003, 345) and Findley and Young (2015, 1121) assert that 
terrorism need not be carried out directly against noncombatants. Even attacks in which only 
combatants, such as military or law enforcement members, are physically injured have a 
significant psychological effect on noncombatants. In addition, not all targets can be neatly 
separated into the categories of combatants and noncombatants. For instance, government 
targets may contain a mixture of combatants and noncombatants, such as the mix of civilian 
and military personnel who work at the U.S. Pentagon. Furthermore, government targets that 
are visited often by civilians, such as the U.S. Capitol Building, are often seen by terrorists as 
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representatives of the government officials, and ordinary citizens, who vote in support of 
military actions (Richardson 1999, 2009). The second problem with the parameters of 
terrorism outlined above concerns the requirement that terrorism have a political and/or 
social purpose. Some scholars argue that, while a political goal may be explicitly stated by a 
terrorist group, this may not truly be the reason for an individual terrorist’s actions or for the 
actions of the group as a whole (Crenshaw 1987, 15 and 19; Wilson 1973). 
 This thesis will define terrorism in accordance with the definition employed by the 
Global Terrorism Database. The Global Terrorism Database defines a terrorist attack as “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐ state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (“Global 
Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 9). In order to be included in the database, an attack 
must first have three attributes. It “must be intentional”, it “must entail some level of 
violence or immediate threat of violence”, and “the perpetrators of the [incident] must be 
sub-national actors” (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 9). Furthermore, an 
attack must meet at least two of the following three criteria: 1) “The act must be aimed at 
attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.”; 2) “There must be evidence of an 
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) than the immediate victims.”; 3) “The action must be outside the context of 
legitimate warfare activities.” (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 9). 
Target Categories 
 Classifying terrorist targets into mutually exclusive groups is a difficult task that 
requires determining how exclusive each group should be. Such an undertaking can result in 
dozens of categories. However, two overarching categories have generally been agreed upon 
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in existing literature. The first category is government targets. These are members of the 
government, government owned facilities, or monuments to a government. This category 
includes targets that consist either only of combatants or of a combination of combatants and 
non-combatants (Coaffee 2010, 939). Civilian targets, in contrast, are not owned by or built 
in honor of a government. Civilian targets include only civilians, or locations where only 
civilians are targeted. They are typically much more easily accessible than are government 
targets, as defending them would be impossible to do without radically altering people’s 
daily lives (Coaffee 2010, 943). Examples of such targets include, but are not limited to, 
private citizens, the media, religious groups, non-governmental organizations, and 













CHAPTER THREE: THE ARGUMENT 
 Previous literature has identified three primary determinants of terrorist target 
selection: ideology, terrorist group capability, and state security countermeasures. However, 
the majority of studies concerning target selection identify ideology as the ultimate 
explanation of terrorist target selection. As defined by Drake, ideology is “the beliefs, values, 
principles, and objectives – however ill-defined or tenuous – by which a group defines its 
distinctive political identity and aims” (1998b, 54-55). Essentially, ideology serves as the 
prism through which a terrorist group identifies the “enemy” based upon subjective morals 
(Drake 1998b, 56 and 58). The most common ideological source referred to in the literature 
is religion. A study by Asal et al. (2009, 270) used zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
to analyze the relationship between religious ideology and terrorist target selection. Religious 
ideology was found to be a statistically significant explanation of target selection. 
Specifically, terrorist groups motivated by religious ideologies were more likely to attack soft 
targets, in this case meaning civilian targets, than government targets (Asal et al. 2009, 274). 
That being said, this theory can be further refined. Extant research concerning the effect of 
terrorist group ideology on target selection treats ideology as a nominal variable in which 
terrorist groups are categorized according to broad ideological classifications, such as 
religion or anti-government sentiments (Asal et al. 2009, 270 and 274; Drake 1998b, 56 and 
58). The specific ideological mechanisms that lead to terrorist target selection, and which 
very well may span multiple traditional ideological categories, have not been isolated and 
explored. This thesis asserts that two ideological stances determine whether or not a terrorist 
group targets civilians. The first is a group’s willingness to sacrifice its own fighters, either 
through suicide terrorism or through extremely difficult missions that are highly likely to 
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result in the death of a high percentage of the attackers. This is because, in order to carry out 
a successful attack against civilians, the attackers must typically be inconspicuous. This can 
be most easily achieved through the use of suicide attackers or attackers with minimal 
weapons (Pape 2003, 346).  
 The second ideological stance that determines whether or not a terrorist group targets 
civilians is the group’s willingness to sacrifice members of its community who are not 
members of the group itself. A terrorist group cannot survive without passive support from 
members of its own community who provide moral support and do not cooperate with 
authorities and/or the group’s enemies (Cronin 2003, 54). If a terrorist group targets civilians, 
it risks accidentally injuring or killing members of its own community. In addition, it risks 
setting a precedent for retaliation against the civilians of its own community. Both of these 
results have the potential to turn members of the terrorist group’s community against it 
(Cronin 2006, 27-29). However, if the group takes the ideological stance that the sacrifice of 
these community members for the “good of the cause” is justified, the potential repercussions 
may be ignored. 
 In his 1998 book, Terrorists’ Target Selection, C. J. M. Drake qualitatively explored 
the impact of terrorist group capabilities on target selection. He identified three capability 
components: quality of leadership, quality of membership, and available material resources 
(Drake 1998a, 73). With respect to the most important component, leadership quality, Drake 
emphasized terrorist group structure, a leader’s experience, a leader’s desires, and a leader’s 
ability to learn (Drake 1998a, 73-79). According to literature on principal-agent theory, these 
four factors are strongly interrelated. According to this theory, a disconnect exists between 
the preferences of leaders and the behavior of subordinates as a result of the incentives of 
 9 
members to pursue private agendas (Abrahams and Potter 2015, 317). The actions of all 
people within a terrorist organization, including leaders and regular members, are the result 
of rational cost-benefit analyses made separately by these individuals. These cost-benefit 
analyses are calculated according to individual incentives. The clash of desires and goals 
arises because the incentives of leaders differ from the incentives of members in four 
fundamental ways. First, regular members have typically been part of terrorist organizations 
for shorter periods of time. Therefore, they have less exposure to conflict than do leaders. As 
a result, they are unlikely to have experienced, and therefore be wary of, the potential 
negative consequences of terrorism, such as overwhelming retaliation that can decimate the 
group or the possible loss of public support if a terrorist group’s action is seen as too extreme 
(Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316; Cronin 2006, 28; Sogeman, 2008). The second difference in 
incentives between leaders and members is in regards to access to resources. Leaders have 
access to the majority, if not all, of the resources held by the terrorist group. In contrast, 
members have access only to the resources allocated to them by the leaders. Resources, of 
course, can be both personal items and items needed to carry out attacks. A lack of resources 
can restrict the actions of members in regards to attacks or incentivize members to attack in 
order to obtain additional resources for themselves (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316; Shapiro 
and Siegel 2007, 406-408). The third incentive concerns commitment levels. Having 
typically been part of the organization since its founding, leaders are more invested, 
physically, emotionally, and financially, than are members who joined later. In addition, 
leaders are typically unable to leave the group, even if they want to do so despite their 
investment in the group, because, as a result of their prominent positions, they are more 
easily identifiable to law enforcement authorities, which seek to kill or capture them 
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(Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316-317). The final difference in incentives is a bit broader: 
members simply have more to gain by carrying out attacks than do leaders. Members are 
more likely to have known someone who was killed in the struggle in which the terrorist 
group is engaged. Therefore, conducting attacks allows members to exact revenge (Abrahms 
and Potter 2015, 316; Moghadam 2006, 722). In addition, leaders, by definition, are already 
as high in the organizational structure as they can be. Members, in contrast, have the 
potential to advance in the organizational ranks. Therefore, conducting terrorist attacks can 
be used by members as a form of outbidding against their rivals within the group. Conducting 
a successful attack enables a member to prove himself as more capable than other members 
or as highly dedicated to the cause (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316). 
 A highly centralized organizational structure serves to alleviate the effects of clashing 
incentives between leaders and regular members. This is because the structure gives the 
leaders, whomever they may be, the power to enforce their desires that result from their 
incentives (Galbraith, 2007). On the other hand, “networked” terrorist groups, or those with 
decentralized organizational structures, do not alleviate the effects of clashing incentives 
between leaders and regular members. This is because the structure gives the leaders less 
power to enforce their desires. Rather, this decentralized structure allows for the creation of 
multiple decision sources that set agendas based on differing incentives (Abrahms and Potter 
2015, 318; Heger et al. 2012, 747-748). This decentralized structure makes it very difficult 
for leaders to set primary agendas, to efficiently communicate these agendas to all members, 
and/or to enforce compliance with them (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, 19-20; Heger 
et al. 2012, 748; Helfsten and Wright 2011, 788-789). This structure gives leaders less 
power. Instead, it delegates power to regular members of the terrorist group, who can then act 
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upon their own desires, which are based on their personal incentives (Abrahms and Potter 
2015, 312; Heger et al. 2012, 745-746). Therefore, a centralized group structure instead 
allows a leader to enforce his choice of target type. This choice is the result of the leader’s 
own incentives. These incentives, as explained above by principal-agent theory, are likely to 
result in a terrorist group leader choosing a government target to attack rather than a civilian 
target. Therefore, terrorist groups that have centralized structures will attack a greater 
percentage of government targets than will terrorist groups with decentralized structures, and, 
vice versa, terrorist groups that have decentralized structures will attack a greater percentage 
of civilian targets than will terrorists groups that have centralized structures. 
 Recent research also indicates that the security of the area in which a potential target 
is located may affect terrorist target selection. A recent study by Brandt and Sandler (2010, 
225) employed Bayesian Poisson regression to test the relationship between target 
fortification and target selection. The authors found that, when a state launched a concerted 
effort to fortify possible terrorist targets owned by the state, terrorists increasingly attacked 
soft targets (2010, 233). This suggests that terrorist groups are more likely to attack targets 
that are less fortified, or in areas with less security, than targets that are more fortified, or in 
areas of higher security.  
From these arguments, the following three preliminary hypotheses can be derived: 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is greater 
for terrorist groups that are willing to sacrifice their fighters than for terrorist groups 
that are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. 
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Hypothesis 2: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is greater 
for terrorist groups with decentralized organizational structures than for terrorist groups 
with centralized organizational structures. 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is greater 
in areas of low security than in areas of high security. 
 However, from the existing literature outlined above, a more complex theory emerges 
that requires rigorous quantitative testing. Terrorist target selection is not simply the result of 
one factor. Rather, it is an amalgamation of factors. Specifically, whether a terrorist group 
attacks a civilian or government target is the result of an interaction of ideology, capability, 
and security. In regards to the interaction between the willingness of a terrorist group to 
sacrifice its fighters and the organizational structure of the terrorist group, regular members, 
rather than leaders, of terrorist groups have an incentive to carry out attacks in order to prove 
themselves. However, these regular members typically have limited resources with which to 
conduct attacks (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316; Shapiro and Siegel 2007, 406-408). The 
willingness to sacrifice themselves and their comrades in an attack, though, allows these 
regular members to avoid lack of resource problems because sacrificing oneself requires only 
one’s own body and less sophisticated weapons, such as knives, guns, or homemade bombs. 
As a result, regular terrorist group members have an incentive to be willing to sacrifice 
themselves and other fighters. A decentralized organizational structure of a terrorist group 
facilitates the implementation of attacks based upon these incentives because it allows for the 
creation of multiple incentive sources and does not give the leaders of the terrorist group 
sufficient power to prevent regular members from acting upon their own incentives 
(Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316 and 318; Heger et al. 2012, 747-748). 
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 The effect of the willingness of a terrorist group to sacrifice its fighters is also related 
to the security in the area in which the terrorist group chooses to attack. This is because 
suicide attacks, or attacks that are highly likely to end in the deaths of the attackers, are easier 
to carry out in unmonitored areas. In contrast, the weapons used during these attacks are 
likely to be detected by the modern security and surveillance equipment utilized in high 
security areas (Brandt and Sandler 2010, 233). The effects of the organizational structure of a 
terrorist group and the security of the area in which that group attacks are related as well. 
This is because, as explained above, regular members, as opposed to leaders, of terrorist 
groups have an incentive to carry out successful attacks in order to prove themselves 
(Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316). Decentralized organizational structures empower these 
regular members to act on their own incentives (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 318; Heger et al. 
2012, 747-748). Also as explained above, successful attacks, such as those sought by these 
regular members to prove themselves, are easier for terrorists to carry out in low security 
areas than in high security areas (Brandt and Sandler 2010, 233).  
 These hypothesized two-way interactions suggest a possible three-way interaction 
between the constituent independent variables. Regular members of terrorist groups have an 
incentive to carry out successful attacks in order to prove themselves (Abrahms and Potter 
2015, 316). A decentralized organizational structure allows the regular members to act upon 
their own incentives (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 318; Heger et al. 2012, 747-748). Successful 
attacks are easier to carry out in areas of low security than in areas of high security (Brandt 
and Sandler 2010, 233). Simultaneously, these regular members typically have fewer 
resources with which to carry out attacks (Abrahms and Potter 2015, 316; Shapiro and Siegel 
2007, 406-408). The willingness to sacrifice themselves and their comrades permits regular 
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members to avoid these resource problems. Furthermore, attacks that require the willingness 
to sacrifice one’s own fighters generally utilize weapons that are better suited to low security 
areas where modern security and surveillance measures that might detect these weapons 
either do not exist or are limited (Brandt and Sandler 2010, 233).  
From these arguments, the following four additional hypotheses are derived: 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is 
greater for decentralized terrorist groups in high security areas that are not willing 
to sacrifice their fighters than for centralized terrorist groups in high security areas 
that are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is 
greater for decentralized terrorist groups in high security areas that are willing to 
sacrifice their fighters than for centralized terrorist groups in high security areas that 
are willing to sacrifice their fighters. 
Hypothesis 6: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is 
greater for decentralized terrorist groups that attack in low security areas and are 
willing to sacrifice their fighters than for centralized terrorist groups that attack in 
low security areas and are willing to sacrifice their fighters.  
Hypothesis 7: The percentage of civilian targets that a terrorist group attacks is 
greater for decentralized terrorist groups that attack in low security areas and are 
willing to sacrifice their fighters than for decentralized terrorist groups that attack in 
high security areas and are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DATA 
Sources 
 The data for this study will come from multiple datasets. The first existing dataset 
that will be used is the Global Terrorism Database, or GTD (“Global Terrorism Database 
(Dataset)” 2016). The second dataset contains the United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crimes’ United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (United Nations 1995-1996). The third dataset is one compiled by Dr. Frederic 
Pearson, Dr. Isil Akbulut-Gok, and Dr. Marie Olson Lounsbery for their paper titled “Group 
Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks: Further Explorations”. This 
dataset is a compilation of their own research, as well as a terrorist network dataset created 
by Brian Phillips and a terrorist group organizational structure dataset created by Dr. Joshua 
Kilberg, among other datasets (“Group Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror 
Networks (Dataset)” 2015). As a result of the available data, this thesis will be limited to 
analyzing data from 1998 to 2005. In addition, data for two terrorist groups active in Western 
Europe and North America during this time period are available from only one of the above 
sources. Therefore, these two groups, and the handful of attacks they perpetrated, are not 
included in this study.  
Independent Variables 
 As stated above, there exist two ideological stances that may lead terrorist groups to 
target civilians. In order to measure these stances, ideally two ideological variables would be 
created. Unfortunately, however, data is not available to measure whether or not a terrorist 
group accepts the potential injuring or killing of members of the community from which the 
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group comes, either by the group itself or by opposition forces in retaliation for the terrorist 
group’s actions. Therefore, as a limitation of this study, this variable will not be included. A 
binary nominal Fighter Sacrifice variable, though, will be created from data in the Global 
Terrorism Database (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 25). Terrorist groups 
that have committed at least one suicide attack in the years preceding the year in question 
will be coded 1 for “Yes”. Terrorists groups that have not committed at least one suicide 
attack in the years preceding the year in question will be coded 0 for “No”. This will result in 
a reference value of “No”. Unfortunately, this operationalization of the variable cannot 
measure the willingness of a terrorist group to sacrifice its own fighters not directly through 
suicide attacks, but rather through attacks in which it is highly probable that members of the 
group will be killed. This is a limitation of this study resulting from the difficulty of 
obtaining the necessary information to include this extended operationalization within the 
time frame allotted to complete this thesis. 
 As outlined by C. J. M. Drake, a terrorist group’s capabilities include the quality of 
leadership of the group (Drake 1998a, 73). Therefore, an independent variable measuring the 
organizational structure type of each terrorist group in a given year will be included in these 
analyses. The variable will be called Decentralized. Data for this variable will come from the 
variable Org_strt in the “Group Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror 
Networks “ dataset. This four-category ordinal variable was first taken from the terrorist 
group organizational structure dataset created by Dr. Joshua Kilberg. It classifies each 
terrorist group as having one of the following four structural types, from most centralized to 
least centralized, in any given year: “bureaucracy”, “hub-spoke”, “all-channel”, and “market” 
(“Group Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks” 2015). First, the 
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variable will simply be renamed Decentralized for clarity. Next, this ordinal-level variable 
will be recoded as a nominal-level variable. The categories “bureaucracy” and “hub-spoke” 
will be recoded as 0 for “Centralized”. The categories “all-channel” and “market” will be 
recoded as 1 for “Decentralized”. This will result in a reference value of “Centralized”. 
 The variable Low Area Security will measure the security level of the area in which 
the terrorist attacks took place. Data for this variable will come from the variable Total 
Police Personnel Rate per 100,000 Population in the United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crimes’ United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (United Nations 1995-2006). This variable measures the police per 100,000 people 
in the state in which the terrorist attacks perpetrated by a given group in a given year took 
place. It is important to note, however, that this dataset presents two limitations. The first, 
and most problematic, is that data for this variable is not available for every state for each 
year in this study. To correct for this, the difference is calculated for each missing time 
period for each state. This difference is then divided by the number of full years missing. The 
dividend, or multiple of the dividend, is then added or subtracted from the last known value 
of the variable to estimate the value of the variable for the missing year. For example, the 
value of the variable Total Police Personnel Rate per 100,000 for France in 2000 was 
211.01. The value of this same variable for France in 2006 was 318.11. No values for this 
variable are available for France for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Therefore, 
they must be estimated. This is done by first calculating the difference on average of the 
value of the variable from 2000 and 2006. During this time period, the value of the variable 
increased by 107.1. Also during this time period, six full years elapsed: 2000-2001, 2001-
2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006. Therefore, the difference of 107.1 
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is divided by 6, resulting in a dividend of 17.85. Because the value of the variable increased 
on average from 2000 to 2006, multiples of this dividend will be added to the value of the 
variable in the year 2000 to estimate the missing values of the variable. Adding 17.85 to 
211.01 results in an estimated value of 228.86 police per 100,000 people in France in 2001. 
Adding 17.85 times 2, or 35.7, to 211.01 results in an estimated value of 246.71 police per 
100,000 people in France in 2002, and so on. Using this estimation technique, the value of 
police per 100,000 population can be calculated for all states for all missing years provided a 
previous value exists for the state on or after the year 1997. If no such previous value exists, 
an estimated value for a certain state for a certain year cannot be calculated. Thankfully, this 
lack of previous data is not common in the dataset created for this thesis. It is primarily only 
a problem because it prohibits the estimation of the value of this variable for the United 
Kingdom for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. The second problem with this variable is that a 
total police per 100,000 population is not available for the United Kingdom as a whole for 
the years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Rather, it is only available for each individual province 
within the United Kingdom. As a result of these two issues, area security data is only 
available for the United Kingdom for the years 2001 and 2002 (United Nations 1995-2006). 
Once the measures of police per 100,000 people have been listed for each state for each year 
within the given time frame, the values will be recoded. The values of this variable in the top 
50
th
 percentile during this time frame will be coded as 1 for “Low Security”. The values of 
this variable in the bottom 50
th
 percentile during this time frame will be coded as 0 for “High 
Security”. This will result in a reference value of “High Security”. While seemingly 
counterintuitive, coding areas of low security as 1 and areas of high security as 0 allows for 
the clearer interpretation of the regression coefficients of this variable and of interaction 
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terms that include this variable. 
 From these independent variables, the following interaction variables will be created: 
Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized, Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security, Decentralized X 
Low Area Security, and Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized X Low Area Security. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable, titled Percent Civilian Attacks, will measure the percentage 
of attacks against civilian targets, rather than against government targets, in a geographic 
area. The Global Terrorism Database contains a variable titled Target/Victim Type. This 
nominal variable codes targets into 22 categories: “Business”, “Government (General)”, 
“Police”, “Military”, “Abortion Related”, “Airports and Aircraft”, “Government 
(Diplomatic)”, “Educational Institution”, “Food and Water Supply”, “Journalism and 
Media”, “Maritime (Includes Ports and Maritime Facilities)”, “Non-Governmental 
Organizations”, “Other”, “Private Citizens and Property”, “Religious Figures and 
Institutions”, “Telecommunications”, “Terrorists/Non-State Militias”, “Tourists”, 
“Transportation (Other than Aviation)”, “Unknown”, “Utilities”, and “Violent Political 
Parties” (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 30-38). In accordance with the 
definitions of government and civilian targets outlined above in the literature review, this 
variable will be recoded into the new variable Target Type. The categories “Government 
(General)”, “Police”, “Military”, and “Government (Diplomatic)” will be recoded as 0 for 
“government target” since they include either only combatants or a combination of 
combatants and noncombatants. The categories “Business”, “Abortion Related”, “Airports 
and Aircraft”, “Educational Institution”, “Food or Water Supply”, “Journalism and Media”, 
“Maritime (Includes Ports and Maritime Facilities)”, “Non-Governmental Organizations”, 
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“Private Citizens and Property”, “Religious Figures and Institutions”, 
“Telecommunications”, “Tourists”, “Transportation (Other than Aviation)”, and “Utilities” 
will be recoded as 1 for “civilian target” since, according to the descriptions in the GTD 
codebook, they include only noncombatants. Attacks against the categories “Terrorists/Non-
State Militias” and “Violent Political Parties will be dropped from the analysis because they 
do not belong in either the government or civilian target categories and there are very few in 
the sample (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 30-38). All attacks in which the 
target is categorized as target type “Unknown” will also be dropped, as this category contains 
a mix of government and civilian targets (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 
33). Once all targets are recoded, the percentage of civilian targets of a certain terrorist group 
in a geographic area in a certain year will be calculated by dividing the number of civilian 
targets attacked by that terrorist group in that geographic area in that year by the total number 
of targets attacked by that terrorist group in that geographic area in that year. The percentage 
will be recorded in the form of a number between and including 0 and 1.0. For the First 
Dataset and the Third Dataset, explained below, the geographic level at which this 
percentage is calculated is the province-level. For the Second Dataset and the Fourth Dataset, 
also explained below, the geographic level at which this percentage is calculated is the state-
level. 
Control Variables 
 Three control variables are included in this study. The first control variable is the 
variable Religious Motivation. This control variable, which comes from the “Group Structure 
and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks” dataset, is included in order to account 
for the possibility that religiously motivated terrorist groups may be more likely to attack 
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civilian targets than are terrorist groups that are not religiously motivated (Asal et al. 2009, 
274; “Group Structure and Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks (Dataset)” 2015). 
Religiously motivated terrorist groups will be coded 1 for “Religiously Motivated”. Terrorist 
groups that are not religiously motivated will be coded as 0 for “Not Religiously Motivated”. 
This will result in a reference value of “Not Religiously Motivated”. The second control 
variable is the variable Region. Terrorist attacks that take place within North America will be 
coded as 1 for “North America”. Terrorist attacks that take place within Western Europe will 
be coded as 0 for “Western Europe”. This will result in a reference value of “Western 
Europe”. This variable will come from the variable Region in the Global Terrorism Database 
(“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 18-19). The third through tenth control 
variables are dummy variables of the years 1998 to 2005: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, and 2005. The dummy variable 1998 is the reference variable for all other 
dummy year variables. These variables come from the variable Year in the Global Terrorism 
Database (“Global Terrorism Database (Codebook)” 2016, 11). The coefficients of these 
variables are not included in the model tables below. They are simply included to control for 








CHAPTER FIVE: THE METHODOLOGY 
 The theory outlined above is tested using quantitative analyses. Multiple ordinary 
least squares, or OLS, regression is used because the dependent variable is a continuous 
variable (Abrams 2007). Four datasets are created using terrorist attacks in Western Europe 
and North America from 1998 to 2005. The First Dataset and the Second Dataset include all 
attacks from the Global Terrorism Database, even if an attack is coded as possibly being 
some other type of attack than a terrorist attack. This is typical when using the Global 
Terrorism Database. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Third Dataset and the 
Fourth Dataset only include attacks that are not coded as possibly being some other type of 
attack than a terrorist attack. Furthermore, in the First Dataset and the Third Dataset, the unit 
of analysis is Percent Civilian Attacks per Year-Group-Province. In the Second Dataset and 
the Fourth Dataset, the unit of analysis is Percent Civilian Attacks per Year-Group-State. For 
each of these four datasets, five regression models are analyzed. Listwise deletion is used in 
the regression analyses because the use of pairwise deletion is likely to cause errors due to 
the tolerance limits of the dependent variable. 
 The first model will test the relationships between the independent ideological 
variable Fighter Sacrifice, the independent capability variable Decentralized, and the 
independent variable Low Area Security and the dependent variable, Percent Civilian 
Attacks, while also including the control variables of Religious Motivation and Region, as 
well as the dummy year variables. The second model will replicate the first model but will 
also include the two-way interaction variable of Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized. The third 
model will replicate the second model but will also include the two-way interaction variable 
of Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security. The fourth model will replicate the third model but 
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will also include the two-way interaction variable of Decentralized X Low Area Security. The 
fifth model will replicate the fourth model but will also include the three-way interaction 








CHAPTER SIX: THE FINDINGS 
Analysis 
 Although it was the original intention of this study to perform all five regression 
models for each of the four datasets, this proved not to be possible. When computing the 
interaction variables for the Third Dataset and the Fourth Dataset, it was determined that 
several of the resulting interaction variables had values that did not vary at all. This was most 
likely due to the relatively small sample size of attacks that were characterized without doubt 
as terrorist attacks during the limited time period of 1998 to 2005. This prevented all five 
regression models from being performed on these two datasets, and, as a result, no regression 
models were ultimately run on the Third Dataset and on the Fourth Dataset. 
 Despite this setback, the First Dataset was able to be analyzed using all five 
regression models. Prior to the regression models, though, descriptive statistics were 
analyzed for each of the three individual independent variables, as well as for the dependent 
variable and two of the control variables. The results are presented in Table 1 below. Clearly, 
several of the variables are skewed. This is most likely a result of the limited geographic 
scope and short time span of these analyses. This is a limitation of this thesis resulting from 
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  Prior to running Models 1 through 5 on the First Dataset, preliminary ordinary least 
squares regression analyses were run for each of the three independent variables. All control 
variables were included for each of these analyses. The first regression found a significant 
positive relationship between the independent variable Fighter Sacrifice and the dependent 
variable Percent Civilian Attacks. This preliminary finding lent support to Hypothesis 1. The 
second regression found a significant positive relationship between the independent variable 
Decentralized and the dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks, lending support to 
Hypothesis 2. However, the third regression found no significant relationship between the 
independent variable Low Area Security and the dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks. 
This finding gave no support to Hypothesis 3. 
 The first regression model presented below tests the relationships between the 
independent variables Fighter Sacrifice, Decentralized, and Low Area Security and the 
dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks using ordinary least squares regression, while 
also controlling for the variables Religious Motivation and Region, as well as for the multiple 
dummy year variables. The results of Model 1 are presented in column one of Table 2. In this 
Model, the relationship between Decentralized and Percent Civilian Attacks is significant at 
the .01 level. In addition, the direction of the relationship is in the expected positive. 
Therefore, the percentage of civilian targets attacked by decentralized terrorist groups is 25.1 
percent greater than the percentage of civilian targets attacked by centralized terrorist groups. 
This supports Hypothesis 2. Because the coefficients of the variables Fighter Sacrifice and 
Low Area Security are not significant, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are not supported by 
Model 1. The R
2
 value of .520 indicates that Model 1 explains 52.0 percent of the variation in 
the dependent variable. 
 27 
 The second regression model tests the relationships between the independent 
variables Fighter Sacrifice, Decentralized, Low Area Security, and Fighter Sacrifice X 
Decentralized and the dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks using ordinary least 
squares regression. The aforementioned control variables are also included. The results of 
Model 2 are presented in column two of Table 2. The regression coefficient of the variable 
Decentralized is significant at the .01 level and in the positive direction. This means that the 
percentage of civilian targets attacked by decentralized terrorist groups that are not willing to 
sacrifice their fighters is 24.4 percent greater than the percentage of civilian targets attacked 
by centralized terrorist groups that are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. The R
2
 value of 
Model 2 is .520, meaning that Model 2 explains 52.0 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable. 
 The third regression model tests the relationships between the independent variables 
Fighter Sacrifice, Decentralized, Low Area Security, Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized, and 
Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security and the dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks 
using ordinary least squares regression. The previously mentioned control variables are also 
included. The results of Model 3 are presented in column three of Table 2. The regression 
coefficient of the variable Decentralized is significant at the .05 level and in the positive 
direction. This means that the percentage of civilian targets attacked by decentralized 
terrorist groups that attack in areas of high security and are not willing to sacrifice their 
fighters is 22.7 percent greater than the percentage of civilian targets attacked by centralized 
terrorist groups that attack in areas of high security and are not willing to sacrifice their 
fighters. The R
2
 value of Model 2 is .525, meaning that Model 2 explains 52.5 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable. 
 28 
 The fourth regression model tests the relationships between the independent variables 
Fighter Sacrifice, Decentralized, Low Area Security, Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized, 
Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security, and Decentralized X Low Area Security and the 
dependent variable Percent Civilian Attacks using ordinary least squares regression. The 
control variables outlined previously are included as well. The results of Model 4 are 
presented in column 4 of Table 2. Surprisingly, none of the regression coefficients of the 
independent variables in the model are significant. The R
2
 value of Model 4 is .525, meaning 
that Model 4 explains 52.5 percent of the variation in the dependent variable 
 The fifth regression model tests the relationships between the independent variables 
Fighter Sacrifice, Decentralized, Low Area Security, Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized, 
Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security, Decentralized X Low Area Security, and Fighter 
Sacrifice X Decentralized X Low Area Security and the dependent variable Percent Civilian 
Attacks using ordinary least squares regression. The control variables mentioned earlier are 
included as well. The results of Model 5 are presented in column 5 of Table 2. The inclusion 
of this three-way interaction variable results in three significant independent variable 
regression coefficients. The variable Decentralized is significant at the .05 level and in the 
expected positive direction. This means that the percentage of civilian targets a terrorist 
group attacks is 30.4 percent greater for decentralized terrorist groups that attack in high 
security areas and are not willing to sacrifice their fighters than for centralized terrorist 
groups that attack in high security areas and are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 4. The variable Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security is 
significant and in the negative direction. The variable Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized X 
Low Area Security is significant and in the positive direction. The significant regression 
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coefficient of the variable Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized X Low Area Security is greater 
than the significant regression coefficient of the variable Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area 
Security. Therefore, the percentage of civilian targets a terrorist group attacks is greater for 
decentralized terrorist groups that attack in areas of low security and are willing to sacrifice 
their fighters than for centralized terrorist groups that attack in areas of low security and are 
willing to sacrifice the fighters. Specifically, this is a difference of 34.4 percent (1.395-
1.051=.344). This supports Hypothesis 6. Furthermore, the percentage of civilian targets that 
a terrorist group attacks is greater for decentralized terrorist groups that attack in areas of low 
security and are wiling to sacrifice their fighters than for decentralized terrorist groups that 
attack in areas of high security and are not willing to sacrifice their fighters. This is a 
difference of 52.0 percent (1.395-.151-.724+.304=.824-.304=.52). This finding supports 
Hypothesis 7. Unfortunately, this model provides no support for Hypothesis 5. 
 Following these findings of the analyses of the First Dataset, the regression models 
were applied to the Second Dataset. However, in each on the five regression models, none of 
the independent variables, nor any of the interactions of the independent variables, were 
found to be significant. This is most likely because the Second Dataset groups terrorist 
attacks at the geographic state-level. As only a few states accounted for the majority of the 
terrorist attacks in North America and Western Europe during this time period, the data was 





Table 2: OLS Regression Models of the Effects of Determinants of Terrorist Target Selection 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variable  B  B  B  B  B 
Fighter Sacrifice  .111  .023  -.056  -.055  .597 
Decentralized  .251**  .244**  .227*  .237  .304* 
Low Area Security  -.008  -.011  -.050  -.038  .051 
Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized    .097  .052  .049  -.724 
Fighter Sacrifice X Low Area Security      .170  .174  -1.051* 
Decentralized X Low Area Security        -.018  -.151 
Fighter Sacrifice X Decentralized X Low Area Security          1.395** 
Religious Motivation  -.207  -.213  -.147  -.146  -.068 
Region  -.063  -.062  -.085  -.087  -.111 
Constant  .507**  .508**  .558**  .558**  .570** 
R
2
  .520  .520  .525  .525  .558 
N  155  155  155  155  155 
Note: * significant at the .05 level, ** significant at the .01 level 
Note: The regression coefficients are unstandardized. 
Note: Dummy variables for the years of this analysis are included in all five models in order to control for heterogeneity across  





 These findings show that decentralized terrorist groups attack a greater percentage of 
civilian targets, as opposed to government targets, when they are willing to sacrifice their 
fighters and carry out their attacks in areas of low security. In contrast, decentralized terrorist 
groups attack a smaller percentage of civilian targets, as opposed to government targets, 
when they are not willing to sacrifice their fighters and when they carry out their attacks in 
areas of high security. Furthermore, decentralized terrorist groups that attack in high security 
areas that are not willing to sacrifice their fighters attack a greater percentage of civilian 
targets than do centralized terrorist groups that attack in high security areas that are not 
willing to sacrifice their fighters. This pattern does not exist in high security areas, though, 
when both centralized and decentralized groups are wiling to sacrifice their fighters. This 
could possibly be because the willingness to sacrifice one’s own fighters has a greater effect 
within the interaction term than does the organizational structure of the terrorist group. In 
contrast, decentralized terrorist groups that attack in low security areas and are willing to 
sacrifice their fighters attack a greater percentage of civilian targets than do centralized 
terrorist groups in low security areas that are willing to sacrifice their fighters. 
 These findings suggest several policy implications. The first is in relation to area 
security. These analyses demonstrate that decentralized terrorist groups, which are especially 
prevalent today in Western Europe and, particularly, in North America, in most instances, 
attack a greater percentage of civilian targets, as opposed to government targets, than do 
centralized terrorist groups, especially in areas with low security. In addition, the findings 
also show that the willingness of a decentralized terrorist group to sacrifice its own fighters 
increases the likelihood of attacks against civilians in low security areas. Special attention, 
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then, should be given to protecting civilian targets in Western states by increasing security 
measures not only at specific sites, such as sporting arenas, but in geographic areas in 
general. This could be done by increasing the police per capita in a region, as well as 
possibly by creating, or increasing the capacity of, counterterrorism divisions at both the 
local-level and state-level and by stationing state-level law enforcement officers and 
counterterrorism divisions in multiple locations throughout single states. Furthermore, a 
counter-narrative to the use of suicide terrorism must also be created and publicized. As 
mentioned above, the willingness of a decentralized terrorist group to use suicide attacks, or 
attacks that are highly likely to result in the death of the attackers, in low security areas 
increases the likelihood of attacks against civilians. Regular terrorist group members are 
most likely to use this method of attack in order to prove themselves as more capable than 
other members or as highly dedicated to the cause, as well as to avoid the problem of limited 
resources. In these instances, sacrificing one’s life has a positive connotation. It is seen as an 
expression of commitment to and belief in the cause. To reduce the use of suicide attacks, 
this psychological narrative must be countered. Governments and non-profit organizations 
must frame the use of suicide attacks as cowardly and selfish. This counter-narrative must be 
publicized through all available methods, including through television ads, online videos, 
Internet articles, social media sites, and classroom lessons. This counter-narrative must reach 
individuals of all ages both within Western states and around the world in order to lessen the 
incentives that regular members of terrorist groups have to use suicide attacks. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of terrorist target 
selection. This study uses ordinary least squares regression to study the effects of terrorist 
group ideological stances, terrorist group capability, and area security levels, as well as two-
way and three-way interactions among these variables, to explain the percentage of attacks 
against civilian targets in certain geographic areas within North America and Western Europe 
from 1998 to 2005. As predicted, this study concluded that decentralized terrorist groups 
attack a statistically greater percentage of civilian targets than do centralized terrorist groups 
in areas of high security and in areas of low security. However, this effect is further 
exacerbated in areas of low security when terrorist groups are willing to sacrifice their own 
fighters. In addition, among decentralized terrorist groups, attacking in low security areas and 
being willing to sacrifice fighters results in a greater percentage of attacks against civilian 
targets than does attacking in high security areas and not being willing to sacrifice fighters. 
Furthermore, as expected, the multiple regression models explain a greater percentage of the 
effects of the independent variables on the percentage of attacks against civilian targets when 
the three-way interaction variable among the terrorist group ideology, terrorist group 
capability, and area security variables is included than when this interaction is not included. 
These findings emphasize the necessity of increasing general area security measures in 
Western states, particularly in geographic areas in which multiple or large potential civilian 
targets are located. Additionally, these findings demonstrated the effect of the willingness of 
terrorist groups to sacrifice their own fighters when attacking in areas of low security. The 
psychological arguments used by terrorist groups to promote the use of suicide attacks and of 
attacks that are highly likely to result in the deaths of the attackers must be countered by 
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Western governments and non-profit organizations in order to decrease the appeal of such 
attacks, and therefore, the incentives of regular terrorist group members to carry out such 
attacks. 
Key Assumptions and Limitations 
 This paper makes two fundamental assumptions. The first is that terrorists are rational 
actors. They make their decisions based on cost-benefit analyses that are determined by 
individual incentives. The second assumption is that terrorist groups are not unitary actors. 
Both assumptions are derived from principal-agent theory, described above, which states that 
the actions of a terrorist group are the result of clashing incentives on the part of individual 
members and leaders. The actions carried out are determined by the structure of the group, 
which either assists in or inhibits the enforcement of actions based on certain incentives 
(Abrahams and Potter 2015, 317; Galbraith 2007). 
 As with all studies concerning terrorism, there are several limitations to these 
analyses. The first is the short time span. This thesis is limited to the time period from 1998 
to 2005. That being said, this time period still spans nearly a decade. In addition, it 
encompasses time both before and after the defining September 11, 2001, attacks on the 
United States. The second limitation is geographic in nature. Only attacks that took place in 
Western Europe or North America are included. This is because specific data on attack 
targets is often difficult to obtain for attacks in other geographic areas. This geographic 
limitation also introduces a third limitation related to regime type. As only terrorist attacks in 
these two geographic areas are considered, the locations of all the analyzed attacks are in 
states with democratic regimes. This limitation makes it impossible to study the effects of 
state regime type on terrorist target selection. 
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 A few variable operationalizations are also problematic. The first potentially 
problematic variable operationalization is that measuring the willingness of a terrorist group 
to sacrifice its own fighters. As mentioned in the data section of this paper, this ideological 
stance is operationalized as a dummy variable that measures for a terrorist group in a given 
year whether or not that terrorist group has launched suicide attacks in previous years. While 
useful, this operationalization is unable to measure a terrorist group’s willingness to sacrifice 
its fighters in attacks that, while not suicide attacks, are likely to result in the deaths of the 
perpetrators. The second possibly problematic operationalization is the inability to include a 
variable measuring a terrorist group’s willingness to sacrifice members of its community who 
are not members of the group itself. The arguments above present a compelling case for the 
effect of this ideological stance on terrorist target selection. However, the data simply does 
not currently exist. The final potentially problematic operationalization is that of area 
security. There are numerous factors that contribute to the security of any given geographic 
area. These include, besides available police, counterterrorism units, physical measures, 
private security, and more. However, while it may be possible to collect data from various 
sources in order to measure some of these other variables, preferably at the province-level or 
city-level rather than at the state-level, the time limitations of this thesis make such an 
endeavor impossible.  
 It is also important to note that this study is limited to attacks by terrorist groups as 
defined by the Global Terrorism Database. The Global Terrorism Database defines a terrorist 
as one or more individuals who commit a terrorist attack, defined as “the threatened or actual 
use of illegal force and violence by a non‐ state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (“Global Terrorism Database 
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(Codebook)” 2016, 9)”. This study is further limited by the fact that it excludes terrorist 
attacks committed by lone individuals and un-established groups, such as the generic group 
categorizations of “anarchist” or “separatists”. These exclusions are necessary, though, due to 
the inherent nature of this thesis, which seeks only to analyze the factors that influence the 
target selections of established terrorist groups. 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 This thesis contributes to existing research in several ways. This study contributes to 
extant research in regards to the effects of terrorist group capability on terrorist target 
selection. Previous research has been mostly speculative; empirical, quantitative analyses are 
lacking (Drake 1998a, 73-95). This thesis provides detailed quantitative analyses to fill this 
gap. Furthermore, this study provides the first quantitative analysis of the effects of area 
security on terrorist target selection. Extant research has been mostly speculative in nature or 
has centered on the security of attacked targets, rather than on the security of the geographic 
areas in which the attacked targets were located (Brandt and Sandler 2010, 225 and 233). 
Future Research 
 There are several ways in which this research can be expanded upon in the future. In 
order to minimize the presence of skewed data, future analyses should include terrorist 
attacks in geographic areas outside of North America and Western Europe, as well as outside 
of the limited time span of 1998 to 2005. Additionally, the variable Fighter Sacrifice should 
be operationalized in such a way as to include not only suicide attacks, but also terrorist 
attacks in which it is highly likely that the attackers will be killed. A Community Sacrifice 
variable measuring the willingness of a terrorist group to sacrifice members of its own 
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community who are not members of the group itself should be included as well. Finally, 
additional measures of area security, such as the presence of counterterrorism units and 
federal law enforcement officers, should be included in any future analyses. 
  
 38 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abrahms, Max, and Philip B. K. Potter. 2015. “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits 
and Militant Group Tactics.” International Organization 69 (Spring): 311–342. 
Abrams, Deborah R. 2007. “Introduction to Regression.” Princeton University Library: Data 
and Statistical Services. 
http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/regression_intro.htm (Accessed July 21, 
2017). 
Asal, Victor H. et al., 2009. “The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection.” 
Journal of Applied Security Research 4 (3): 258-278. 
Brandt, Patrick T., and Todd Sandler. 2010. “What Do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has 
It Changed? Are We Safer?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2): 214-236. 
Coaffee, Jon. 2010. “Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK’s Resilience Response to 
Defending Everyday Urban Infrastructure.” International Affairs 86 (4): 939-954. 
Crenshaw, Martha. 1987. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches.” Journal of Strategic Studies 10 (4): 13-31. 
Cronin, Audrey K. 2003. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.” 
International Security 27 (3): 30–58. 
Cronin, Audrey K. 2006. “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Groups.” International Security 31 (1): 7–48. 
Drake, C. J. M. 1998a. Terrorists’ Target Selection. New York City, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc. 
Drake, C. J. M. 1998b. “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection.” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 10 (2): 53-85. 
 39 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Calvert Jones. 2008. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit 
Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think.” International 
Security 33 (2): 7-44. 
Faiola, Anthony, and Souad Mekhennet. 2015. “Paris Attacks Were Carried Out by Three 
Groups Tied to Islamic State, Official Says.” The Washington Post, 15 November. 
Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young. 2015. "Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution 
of Civil Wars." Journal of Politics 77 (4): 1115-1128. 
Galbraith, Jay R. 2007. “Organization Design.” In Handbook of Organization Development, 
ed. Thomas G. Cummings. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 325–352. 
Heger, Lidsay, Danielle Jung, and Wendy Wong, 2012. “Organizing for Resistance: How 
Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence.” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 24 (5): 743-768. 
Meisels, Tamar. 2006. “The Trouble with Terror: The Apologetics of Terrorism—A 
Refutation.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (3): 465-483. 
Moghadam, Assaf. 2006. “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of 
Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (8): 
707–729. 
Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science Review 
97 (3): 343-361. 
Pearson, Frederic S., Isil Akbulut, and Marie Olson Lounsbery. 2015. “Group Structure and 
Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks: Further Explorations.” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 29 (3): 550-572. 
 40 
Pearson, Frederic S., Isil Akbulut, and Marie Olson Lounsbery. 2015. “Group Structure and 
Intergroup Relations in Global Terror Networks: Further Explorations (Dataset).” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 29 (3): 550-572. 
Richardson, Louise. 1999. “Terrorists as Transnational Actors.” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 11 (4): 209-219. 
Shapiro, Jacob N., and David A. Siegel. 2007. “Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations.” 
International Studies Quarterly 51 (2): 405–429. 
START. 2016. “Global Terrorism Database (Codebook).” National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: A Department of Homeland Security 
Science and Technology Center of Excellence, 1-35. 
START. 2016. “Global Terrorism Database (Dataset).” National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: A Department of Homeland Security Science 
and Technology Center of Excellence. 
Tilly, Charles. 2004. “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.” Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5-13. 
Walzer, Michael. 2002. “Five Questions About Terrorism.” Dissent 49 (1): 5–10. 
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books. 
Witte, Griff, Souad Mekhennet, and Michael Birnbaum. 2016. “Islamic State Claims 
Responsibility for the Brussels Attacks.” The Washington Post, 22 March. 
United Nations. 1995-2006. “United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (Dataset).” United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes’. 
